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The anatomy of a business game




Stockholm School of Economics
We describe in detail a business game, which has been used extensively in
education for a decade. Although the business game is smaller than other
games, it is fairly realistic as it includes decisions on investments, production,
prices, and advertising. Furthermore, the game has dynamic properties, in
that decisions and financial states of the firms carry over from one period to
the next. There are not many so detailed descriptions of business games,
although this is in demand. Such a complete mathematical description lays
ground not only for alterations of the game, but also for developments of new
games. It can also provide a link to models used in micro-economic theory.
1  Introduction
Business games are played to give participants a better understanding of how
markets work and how to make decisions.  The games are often designed to be
fairly realistic models of industries in business life. Therefore, business games
have a number of decision variables and also dynamic properties.
    In the related fields of microeconomics and industrial organization (Tirole,
1986), game models are described in detail. Furthermore, the games are used
for experiments (Holt, 1995). The purpose of the experiments is to study the
decisions made. As these models are described in detail, the best decisions can
be calculated and used as benchmarks when studying decisions made in the
experiments. However, in economics, there have for a number of years been
calls for more realistic, and therefore also more complex, models with
dynamic properties (from, for example Shubik, 1975, to Vives, 1999). The
relative realism of business games makes them a good complement to models
in economics.
    We shall here describe a business game (Ståhl, 1986) in detail. The game
has been used extensively for over a decade as it has been played regularly as
part of courses at different universities and in executive training in the US,
Sweden, England, France, Russia and the Baltic states.
      It is played for 3-4 hours, including briefing and debriefing. The game is
smaller than other business games, which typically are played for days.
Therefore, it enables us to describe it in full detail, using mathematical                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 2
formulas, without being too lengthy. The business game has resemblance to
some models listed in Gold (2001). Two of the few examples in economics of
similar models are Stigler (1968), where the decision variable advertising is
referred to as a non-price competition variable, and a marketing model in
Shubik & Levitan (1980). These models are, however, static.
      To our knowledge, there are few complete mathematical descriptions of
business games. Such descriptions can improve the scientific knowledge of
gaming/simulation (Wolfe & Crookall 1998) and provide the ground for new
and improved games. The mathematical description of the game also allows
the determination of theoretical solutions of the game and might also lay
ground for how other business games can be described.
      First, we shall describe the business game generally. Then, we describe the
game in detail, mathematically. Finally, we discuss how this detailed
description can be used.
2     General description
1
The business game deals with an oligopoly market where firms compete, by
producing and selling similar, but not identical, storable products. The
objective of a firm is to maximize the equity at the end of the game.
   The game has dynamic properties, as the following four state variables are
carried over from one period to the next:
−  Machine capacity
−  Stocks
−  Balance on checking account
−  Cumulative advertising
 The variables above represent the state of each firm in the different periods of
the game. Equity is calculated as the value of machine capacity and stocks
plus the balance on the checking account. The cumulative advertising is not
included in the equity, as presented in the balance sheet of the game
2.
    All firms start with the same amount of equity, consisting only of cash on
the checking account. Hence, the firms have initially no machine capacities,
no units in stock and no cumulative advertising.
                                                          
1 The rules of the business game are presented in appendix A.
2 There were several reasons for not including cumulative advertising in the equity
shown in the reports on the balance sheets of the firms, although from a theoretical
point of view it could be regarded as part of the equity. The main reason was one of
pedagogical realism. The cumulative advertising is in reality seldom included in the
balance sheet or even known exactly, especially not by competitors. Furthermore,
when the game is ended after a certain number of periods, the theoretical value of
cumulative advertising at the end of the last period can be regarded as 0.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 3
The firms have to decide upon the following four decision variables in each
period, as the firms produce to sell their products on the market:
−  Investments in machinery
−  Production quantity
−  Advertising
−  Prices
Each unit of machinery has a fixed cost. One unit of machine capacity can
produce one unit of the product in each period of the game. The cost of
producing one unit is also fixed.
   As the decisions are made, three outcome variables are calculated:
−  Interest rate
−  Demand
−  Sales
Each firm has a checking account. If the balance on the checking account is
negative, e.g. due to outlays on investment, production and advertising, the
firms can borrow money. The interest rate is determined by an interest
function. The interest rate depends on the size of the balance on the checking
account and the equity of the firm. The more negative the balance and the
smaller the equity, the higher the interest rate.
   The demand for a firm's products in a period is dependent not only on the
price and the cumulative advertising of that firm, but also on the prices and the
cumulative advertising of the other firms competing on the same market. The
model in the game has the characteristics of an oligopoly market, where there
is interdependence among the firms. In this connection it should be mentioned
that there are no random factors involved in the game, not even as regards the
demand for the products. Thus, the state variables and the decisions of the
firms completely determine the outcome.
   The  machines  depreciate  each  period, both physically and in accounting
terms. Products not sold in one period go into stocks and can be sold in a
subsequent period. Cumulative advertising consists of advertising in a period,
plus a part of the cumulative advertising from the previous period, plus a
factor reflecting the advertising effect of sales in the previous period. The
profit is the difference between the equity at the end of a period and the equity
at the start of a period.
    If a firm has equity below zero, it goes into bankruptcy. The firm can then
receive a money grant from the government that decreases its debt and thus
increases its equity. If a firm goes into bankruptcy repeatedly, the game leader
may exclude it from the game.
    The game can be played with a test period, where the firm can test their
decisions. The game is then restarted from “scratch” and played for 5-10
periods. Normally it is played with uncertainty about exactly how many
periods will be played.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 4
3   Detailed description
In this section, the business game is described in detail using mathematical
notations. The mathematical description below is linked to the decision form
used when the game is played, presented in Appendix B, and the reports,
presented in Appendix C. The variables in the decision form and in the sample
report are numbered with the same numbers as in the mathematical description
below. Furthermore, the model below is summarized in Appendix G.
   There are variables of three types: decision variables and outcome variables,
both denoted with lower case letters, and state variables, denoted with upper
case letters. We here use dots to represent different states of the state variables
in the game.
3 For example, capacity, denoted K , can have three different
states:  K K K & & &, , . These states are:
−  Variables at the start of a period are denoted with plain letters, e.g.  . K
−  Intermediate variables in a period are denoted with one dot, e.g.  . K &
−  Variables at the end of a period are denoted with two dots, e.g.  . K & &
There are also a number of parameters, denoted with Greek characters.
We shall describe the model in the following five steps:
−  State variables at the start of a period
−  Decision variables determined in the beginning of the period
−  Intermediate state variables due to these decisions
−  Outcome variables determined during the period
−  State variables at the end of a period
The timing of the state variables, the decision variables and the outcome
variables are shown in Figure 1 below.
Start of
period
Decisions Intermediate  Outcome                   End of
                                    period
K i K &                                                K & &
S o S &                                                S& &
C C &        r                                     C & &
A a A &                                                 A & &
p       q d,
E                                                E & &
 - - - - | - - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - -|∧∧∧∧∧∧∧∧∧∧∧∧∧∧| - - - - -
                                                                                 “long time”
Figure 1. State variables and decision variables in the model.
                                                          
3 Please note that the use of dots in this study is different from the use of dots in other
studies, where the dot is often used to indicate time derivatives.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 5
3.1    State variables at the start of a period
The variables at the start of a period are shown in Table 1 below.
State variable at the start of a period Parameters Restriction
(1) K = Capacity, units of machines σ 0 ≥ K
(2) S = Stocks, in units χ 0 ≥ S
(3) C = Checking account balance
(4) A = Cumulative advertising µ, η 0 ≥ A
Table 1. State variables at the start of a period
Equity is calculated as a combination of three of the four basic state variables
(i.e. excluding A as mentioned in footnote 1), and the two parameters,
σ andχ
4:
(5) 0 ≥ + + = C S K E χ σ
σ  is the cost of one unit of machinery and  K σ  the value of capacity, χ  is the
direct cost of producing one unit and S χ  the value of stocks. C is the balance
on the checking account. A positive balance implies a cash surplus and a
negative balance implies a loan. A firm can have negative cash as part of its
equity, as long as the equity  0 ≥ E .
3.2    Decision variables in a period
In each period, the firms have to make four decisions. A general restriction is
that all decision variables must be non-negative. There are some specific
restrictions as shown in Table 2 below.
Decision variable Restriction
(6) i = investments in units of machinery 0 ≥ i
(7) o = production output in units 0 ≥ ≥ o K &
(8) a = advertising 0 ≥ ≥ a a
MAX
(9) p =p r i c e χ > > p p
MAX
Table 2. Decision variables in a period.
                                                          
4 The parameters and the restrictions on variables are summarized in Appendix F,
where they are given the numerical values used in most games played up to now.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 6
3.3   Intermediate variables in a period
At the time the decisions are made, the model has an intermediate state, where
the basic state variables are transformed to intermediate state variables. The
intermediate state variables have, as mentioned, the same capital letters as the
state variables, but they are denoted with one dot on top of the letter.
   The intermediate capacity consists of the capacity at the start of a period plus
the investments in the period.
(10) i K K + = &
As shown in Table 2, the intermediate capacity poses a restriction on
production, as production is restricted to capacity, i.e.  K o & ≤ .
   The supply of products that can be sold on the market from the intermediate
stocks is denoted S & . It consists of unsold units of the product from earlier
periods plus the amount of units produced in the period.
(11) o S S + = &
The payments of a firm for investments, production and advertising are
denoted P , where:
(12) a o i P + + = χ σ
The balance on the intermediate checking account is denoted C & . It is an
intermediate state depending on the checking account balance at the start of
the period minus the payments, due to decisions made in the period.
(13) P C C − = &                          i.e.         a o i C C − − − = χ σ &
When the balance on the intermediate checking account C &  is positive, the
firms are said to have cash. When C &  is negative, a loan is automatically taken
up. There is a restriction on the loan, 
MIN C C ≥ & , where 
MIN C  is the lowest
negative balance allowed on the checking account.
    A, as in (4), is the cumulative advertising at the start of the present period.
The advertising a in the present period is added to this cumulative advertising
to form the intermediate cumulative advertising,  A & .
(14) a A A + = &                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 7
3.4    Outcome variables in a period
There are three outcome variables: interest rate, demand and sales.
3.4.1      Interest rate
The interest rate, r , is a function of C &  and E , more specifically the quotient
of them,  E C / & .
(15)      r =  ) , ( E C r &
If the checking account balance C &  is positive, the interest rate is given by the
flat rate  0 >
CASH r . If the balance is negative, a loan is taken up automatically.
The interest rate is then variable in the interval 
MAX MIN r r r ≤ ≤ . The smaller
the quotient  E C / & , i.e. the higher absolute value of  E C / & , the higher the
interest rate. The interest function r  is not continuous and not differentiable.
When  C &  is very close to 0, r  jumps down from 
MIN r  to 
CASH r . Figure 2
below, illustrates the interest function.
Figure 2. Interest function.
The interest function is presented as an interest table when the game is played.
Appendix D contains this interest table as well as the exact interest function.
Interest rate
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3.4.2      Demand
We next present the demand, d , for each firm’s product. The demand consists
of four components, denoted  4 3 2 1 , , , d d d d , which are multiplied to determine
the demand. We have chosen a multiplicative function both because it has
appeared realistic and because it makes it easier find the optimal strategies of
the game (see section 4).
The first two components,  1 d  and  2 d , reflect the effect of the firm’s price,  p ,
and its cumulative advertising,  A & .  1 d  implies a constant price elasticity and
2 d  that the marginal effect of one additional dollar spent on advertising
decreases steadily as advertising increases.
5
(16a) β α
− = p d1                             (16b)  ( ) ς + = A d & ln 2
The next two components,  3 d  and  4 d , represent the interdependence among
firms. We denote the total number of firms on the market N . We denote the
mean price and the mean cumulative advertising of all firms,  N p  and  N A & ,
respectively.
( 17a)  N p p
N
j
i N / ) (
1 ∑
=
=  and     ( 17b)  N A A
N
j




The component  3 d , interdependence of prices, depends on the difference
between the price of a firm and the mean price of all N firms on the market.
The component  4 d , interdependence of cumulative advertising, depends on
the difference between the cumulative advertising of a firm and the mean
cumulative advertising of all firms on the market:
(18a)
N N p p p / ) ( −                       (18b)  N N A A A & & & / ) ( −
The demand of a firm’s product becomes higher, if its price is lower than the
mean price on the market. Also, the demand for a firm’s product becomes
higher if its cumulative advertising is higher than the mean cumulative
advertising on the market. For prices, small differences do not matter much,
but large differences can have a strong effect. Therefore we assume an
exponential effect for differences on prices. However, for differences in
cumulative advertising we assume a proportional effect.
                                                          
5 The parameter ς  in (16b) ensures that  ( ) 0 ln ≥ +ς A & , i.e. that  0 2 ≥ d                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 9
(19a) N N p p p e d
/ ) (
3
− =                       (19b)  N N A A A d & & & / ) ( 1 4 − + =
There are altogether N  firms on the market and we shall use n, where is
1 − = N n , to denote the number of competitors of the studied firm. We shall
distinguish the price of this firm,  p , from the mean price of the n other firms
n p , and the cumulative advertising of this firm,  A & , from the mean cumulative
advertising of the n other firms,  n A & .
The mean price and the mean cumulative advertising of the all firms can now
be reformulated as:
(20a) N np p p n N / ) ( + =    (20b)  N A n A A n N / ) ( & & & + =
For prices, we use (20a) in (18a)
(21) N N N p p p p p / 1 / ) ( − = − = ) /( 1 n np p Np + −
and we get the following interdependence function for price:
(22) ) /( 1
3 ) , (
n np p Np
n e p p d
+ − =
Correspondingly for cumulative advertising, we use (20b) in (18b)
(23)
N N N N A A A A A A A d & & & & & & & / 1 / 1 / ) ( 1 4 = − + = − + =
and we get the following interdependence function for cumulative advertising:
(24) ) ( ) , ( 4 n n A n A A N A A d & & & & & + =
We can hence define the demand function facing a firm as dependent on its
price  p , its cumulative advertising  A &  and the mean price  n p  and the mean
cumulative advertising  n A &  of the other n firms.
(25) ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , ( 4 3 2 1 n n n n A A d p p d A d p d A A p p d & & & & & =
In appendix E, there is a demand table that can be used for making a rough
estimate of the demand, with the decisions of one of the firms,  p  and  A & , in
the two leftmost columns and the mean decisions of the other n firms,  n p  and
n A & , in the top two rows.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 10
We illustrate the demand on the market with Figure 3 below.  The curves in
the figure are so-called iso-curves, contouring all the points that refer to the
demand for a given number of units. The figure is based on the parameter
values in Appendix F and the assumption that all firms here have the same
price and the same cumulative advertising, i.e. that we have symmetric
decisions.





















Figure 3. Demand under symmetric decisions.
3.4.3      Sales
Sales, denoted q, is the smallest of demand, d , and supply, S & .
(26) ] , min[ S d q & = (sales)
If demand is bigger than supply, i.e.  S d & > , the difference between demand
and supply is called lost sales.
(27) S d & − (lost sales)                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 11
3.5       State variables at the end of a period
The four state variables are updated at the end of a period. Capacity is
decreased by depreciation:
(28) K K & & & ) 1 ( δ − =
Stocks are decreased by the number of units sold:
(29) q S S − = & & &
The checking account balance is affected by the revenue pq and the interest
payment  C r & , which is negative, if the intermediate balance on the checking
account is negative, i.e. a loan is taken, and otherwise positive.
(30) C r pq C C & & & & + + =
The cumulative advertising is also changed. A fraction, µ , of intermediate
cumulative advertising,  A & , remains and to this is added an effect of sales, e.g.
in the form of word-of-mouth influence, of having sold q units, such that each
unit sold has the same effect as η spent on advertising at the end of the period.
(31) q A A η µ + = & & & cumulative advertising
The equity at the end of a period is, just as the equity at the start of a period
(5), equal to the sum of capacity, stock and checking account balance:
(32) C S K E & & & & & & & & + + = χ σ
Capacity, stocks, checking account and equity are at the end of the period
presented in the balance sheet (see appendix C).
   Since the business game is dynamic, the state variables at the end of a period
are, if the game is not ended, the state variables at the start of the next period.
Up to now all variables have referred to the same period and no period indices
have been necessary, but here we need an index t to denote the period. Hence
we have for the opening balances in the next period that:
(33a)  t t K K & & = +1 (33b)  t t S S & & = +1
(33c)  t t C C & & = +1 (33d)  t t A A & & = +1                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 12
3.6      Deriving the profit from the balance sheet 
We shall derive the profit from the balance sheet (Appendix C), and specify
the components of the profit. The profit of a firm consists of the equity at the
end of the period minus the equity at the start of the period.
(34) E E − = Π & &
Using first (28), (29) and (30) in (31) and then also (10), (11), (12) and (13)
(35) = + + + − + − = C r pq C q S K E & & & & & & ) ( ) 1 ( χ δ σ
         = + + − + − + + + − C r pq P C q o S i K & ) ( ) )( 1 ( χ δ σ
         = + + − − − + − + + + − + C r pq a o i C q o S i K i K & χ σ χ χ χ σδ σ σ ) (
                          = + + + + − − − C S K C r K a q pq χ σ σδ χ & &
         E C r K a q pq + + − − − & & σδ χ
This gives the profit in the income statement (Appendix C).
(36) C r K a q pq & & + − − − = Π σδ χ
The sales revenue for each firm is calculated as:
(37) pq (revenue)
The cost components are the following three items:
(38) q χ (cost of sold units)
where χ  is the unit cost of production
 ( 8) a (cost of advertising)
(39) K & δσ (depreciation)
where δ  is the fraction of depreciation and σ  the unit price of a machine.
   The last item is either revenue or cost:
(40) C r & (interest payment)
where r  is the interest rate and C &  is the intermediate balance on the checking
account, i.e. after payments.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 13
We illustrate the profit on the market with Figure 4 below.  Like in Figure 3
on demand, we assume that all firms here have the same price and the same
cumulative advertising, i.e. we have symmetric decisions. The curves are
contouring all the points that refer to the profit of a given amount. The figure
is based on the parameters in Appendix F and refers to the profits obtained in
the first period.













25 50 75 100 125
•
Figure 4.  Profits under symmetric decisions.
4     Playing the game
The detailed description above shows, among other things, the following
important concepts:
(I)  The timing of state variables, decision variables and outcomes.
(II)  The dynamic properties of the game, the state variables capacity, stock,
checking account and cumulative advertising.
(III)  The relationship between the decisions (in the decision form) and
income statement and balance sheet (in the reports).
(IV)  The interdependence between the firms’ decisions determining the
demand for their products and the demand table.
(V)  The determinants of the interest rate: balance on the checking account
and equity
(VI)  The notion of lost sales, as the difference between demand and supply.
(VII) The determinants of profit.
A natural question is here “Are there some decisions that are more profitable
than others?” (Neal 1999).                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 14
This question can be extended to the apparent and common question among
the participants when playing the game:  “How much profits can a firm earn in
the game given it makes the best possible decisions?”. This question is of
importance for the learning when playing the game (Faria, 2001), as we can
compare the decisions made during the play of the game to these best
decisions. As we shall discuss below, the question of which decisions are the
best ones is not easily answered. Furthermore, in order to be able to answer
this question, we need a detailed description of the game.
        As can be seen in Figure 4 above that, with symmetric decisions, a
relatively high price of about 52 and a relatively low advertising of about 36
give the highest profits in the first period. Such decisions would be the
decisions of a cartel that maximizes the total profit for all firms on the market
in the first period. These “best decisions” are called cooperative solution or
joint-maximum solution (Shubik & Levitan, 1980)
    However, these decisions might not the best decisions of a single firm that
maximizes its own profits. For example, one single firm could increase its
profit by having lower prices and higher advertising, if the other firms stuck to
the cooperative solution. If all firms make decisions only to maximize their
own profits, regarding the decisions of the others as given, their best decisions
would, if they also knew the decisions of the other firms, constitute what is
called the non-cooperative solution or the Nash-solution (Nash, 1951 and
Tirole, 1986). In this equilibrium solution, no single firm can increase its
profit by changing its decision, if the other firms stick to their decisions.
     Typically, the profits are lower in the non-cooperative solution than in the
cooperative solution. The price would be lower and advertising higher. The
Nash solution for the parameters in Appendix F would for a one-period game
imply a price of about 39 and advertising of about 120. It should be mentioned
that in multi-period games, which are the rule, both the cooperative and non-
cooperative solutions would be somewhat different from the solutions
mentioned above. The differences between the cooperative and non-
cooperative solutions are, however, much bigger than the differences for each
of these solutions for different number of periods
6.
     It has been our experience from a great many games that the learning effect
from the debriefing session at the end of the game has improved considerably
when one has made comparisons between the decisions made during the game
and the solutions according to these two solution concepts.
    Such comparisons are also of interest for research, where we can ask the
question “Which of the solutions give the best description of the decisions
when the game is played”. Furthermore, with a detailed description of the
game, the parameters in the game can be modified to fit data from a real
market. Comparisons can then be made between the decisions on the market
and best decisions according to the two solutions.
                                                          
6 The cooperative and the non-cooperative solutions for this game have been
calculated numerically for different number of periods in Edman (2000).                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 15
Appendix A − The rules of the game
You compete on a market with n other firms, producing a
similar, but not identical, storable product. In each
period, you make four decisions:
1. Number of machines, i, to be purchased at $ σ per unit
2. Number of units, o, to be produced at $ χ per unit
3. Amount of money, a, (in $) to be spent on advertising
4. Price, p, of the product (in $)
You can use decimals numbers for your decisions. One machine
can produce one product unit. Total machine capacity sets
the limit on total production. Thus, in period 1 you can
only produce as much as the capacity you buy.
   Machinery is subject to real depreciation; a fraction δ
of the capacity breaks down each period.
   At the start, each firm has 0 machines, 0 units in stock,
and $ C1 in cash on a checking account.
   If there is not enough cash to cover investments, cost of
production and advertising, money will automatically be
borrowed. Interest rates rise with the borrowed amount as
well as increased debts in relation to equity. The rate is
given in the attached table.
   Sales in a period depend on price and advertising
policies, mainly those of the period, but to some extent
also those of earlier periods. Market research indicates: If
all firms in the first period charge $ p on price and spend
$ a on advertising, each firms sells roughly d units.
   A suitable goal might be to maximize equity at the end of
the game, where Equity = Capacity * $ σ + Stock * $ χ +
Checking account.
   In the case that a firm obtains a negative equity, it
will go bankrupt. In that case the game leader can either
decide upon the firm ceasing operations, i.e. leaving the
game, or being taken over by the government.
   At the end of every period, each firm obtains a report on
its own income statement and its own balance sheet, as well
different types of reports on the other firms.
   The game starts with a test period when all reports are
given. The game is then restarted from period 1 again, so
that the test period will not have any effect on the "real
game" played over (at least) T periods.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 16
Appendix B − Decision form
                                       Firm number j  Period t
                        Machine    Production Payments     Cash
Equity                  Capacity   and stocks          (or loans)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Production capacity   K  units                              (1)
Stocks                             S  units                   (2)
Cash (if negative = loan)                              $ C   (3)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Decision 1
New investment in      ========
capacity $ σ  per unit |   i    | units         $   i σ           (6)
                       ========                -------
Total available
capacity (1)+(6)        i K K + = &  units                       (10)
                       ---------
Decision 2
Production at $ χ                                         
per unit (may not                  ========
exceed (10)                        |  o   |        o χ           (7)
                                   ========    -------
Quantity available
for sales (2)+(7)              o S S + = &                  (11)
                                    ---------
Decision 3                                     ========
Advertising                                  $ |  a   |       (8)
                                               ========
Total payments                                            
(6)+(7)+(8)                                  $  a o i P + + = χ σ (12)
                                               ---------------
Remaining cash                                           
(row 1 − row 8)                              $  P C C − = &     (13)
if negative = loan                             ----------
Decision 4     ========
Price        $ |   p   |                                       (9)
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Appendix C − Reports
                                         Firm number j  Period t
Outcome
Interest rate            r     (r  depends on  E C / & )




Revenues           $     pq
Cost of goods sold $     q χ   
Advertising costs  $     a   
Interests          $     C r &    
Depreciation       $   K & δσ
---------------------------








Machine capacity   $    K & & σ         
Stocks  ¤          $    S& & χ    
Cash               $    C & &
    
---------------------------





Reports on other firms
          Price(9)  Sales(15)   Market share Advertising (8)
Firm 1       p          q             ∑q q/         a
…
Firm N       p          q             ∑q q/         a
---------------------------------------------------------
Total(s)             ∑q                       ∑a
        Capacity(16) Stock(17)  Cash/Loans(18) Equity (19)
          units      units           $           $
Firm 1      K & &          S& &             C & &           E & &
…
Firm N      K & &          K & &             C & &           E & &                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 18
Appendix D – Interest table
                                             Interest rates and interest payments
                                                                       Equity
 Loan      50         100        150        200        250        300
  50   16% (  8)  14% (  7)  13% (  7)  13% (  7)  13% (  7)  13% (  7)
 100   19% ( 19)  16% ( 16)  15% ( 15)  14% ( 14)  14% ( 14)  13% ( 13)
 150   21% ( 32)  18% ( 27)  16% ( 24)  15% ( 23)  14% ( 21)  14% ( 21)
 200   23% ( 46)  19% ( 38)  17% ( 34)  16% ( 32)  15% ( 30)  15% ( 30)
 250   24% ( 60)  20% ( 50)  18% ( 45)  17% ( 43)  16% ( 40)  15% ( 38)
 300   26% ( 78)  21% ( 63)  19% ( 57)  18% ( 54)  17% ( 51)  16% ( 48)
 350   27% ( 95)  22% ( 77)  20% ( 70)  19% ( 67)  18% ( 63)  17% ( 60)
 400   28% (112)  23% ( 92)  21% ( 84)  19% ( 76)  18% ( 72)  17% ( 68)
 450   28% (126)  24% (108)  21% ( 95)  20% ( 90)  19% ( 86)  18% ( 81)
 500   28% (140)  24% (120)  22% (110)  20% (100)  19% ( 95)  18% ( 90)
 550   28% (154)  25% (138)  23% (127)  21% (116)  20% (110)  19% (105)
 600   28% (168)  26% (156)  23% (138)  21% (126)  20% (120)  19% (114)
 650   28% (182)  26% (169)  24% (156)  22% (143)  21% (137)  20% (130)
 700   28% (196)  27% (189)  24% (168)  22% (154)  21% (147)  20% (140)
 750   28% (210)  27% (203)  24% (180)  23% (173)  21% (158)  20% (150)
 800   28% (224)  28% (224)  25% (200)  23% (184)  22% (176)  21% (168)
 850   28% (238)  28% (238)  25% (213)  23% (196)  22% (187)  21% (179)
 900   28% (252)  28% (252)  26% (234)  24% (216)  22% (198)  21% (189)
 950   28% (266)  28% (266)  26% (247)  24% (228)  23% (219)  22% (209)
1000   28% (280)  28% (280)  26% (260)  24% (240)  23% (230)  22% (220)
Figures within parentheses refer to interest payments in $. These payments are
rounded to the nearest integer in the table, but not in the game.
If  0 < C & , the interest rate r  is calculated from C &  and E  in the following steps:
) 1 , max( C l & − = ;  ) 5 . 0 , max(E e = ;  e l s / = ;
if  1 ≤ s  then  s r 04 . 0 12 . 0 + =  else   ; 005 . 0 )) 2 ln( ) 2 (ln( 04 . 0 10 . 0 s s r + + + =
) ), , min(max(
MAX MIN r r r r = , where   13 . 0 =
MIN r  and  28 . 0 =
MAX r .
If  0 ≥ C & ,  10 . 0 = =
CASH r r .                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 19
Appendix E – Demand table
Price 25 25 25 25 25 30 30 30 30 30 35 35 35 35 35 40 40 40 40 40 45 45 45 45 45
Price Cum.Adv. 50 100 150 200 250 50 100 150 200 250 50 100 150 200 250 50 100 150 200 250 50 100 150 200 250
25  50 13.6 7.6 5.2 4.0 3.215.6 8.7 6.0 4.6 3.717.3 9.6 6.7 5.1 4.118.810.4 7.2 5.5 4.520.111.2 7.7 5.9 4.8




30  50 59.542.533.027.022.968.248.737.931.026.275.854.142.134.429.182.258.745.737.431.687.862.748.839.933.8
30 100 8.9 4.9 3.4 2.6 2.110.3 5.7 4.0 3.0 2.511.6 6.5 4.5 3.4 2.812.8 7.1 4.9 3.8 3.013.8 7.6 5.3 4.0 3.3
30 150 17.410.4 7.5 5.8 4.720.312.2 8.7 6.8 5.522.813.7 9.8 7.6 6.225.015.010.7 8.3 6.827.016.211.6 9.0 7.4
30 200 24.315.511.4 9.0 7.428.418.113.210.5 8.631.920.314.911.8 9.735.022.316.312.910.737.824.017.613.911.5
30 250 30.020.015.012.010.035.023.317.514.011.739.426.319.715.813.143.228.821.617.314.446.631.123.318.615.5
35  50 34.824.118.414.912.540.528.121.517.414.645.631.624.119.516.450.034.626.521.418.053.937.328.623.119.4
35 100 38.827.721.517.614.945.232.325.120.617.450.936.328.323.119.655.839.931.025.421.560.243.033.427.423.1
35 150 6.1 3.4 2.3 1.8 1.5 7.2 4.0 2.8 2.1 1.7 8.2 4.6 3.2 2.4 2.0 9.1 5.1 3.5 2.7 2.2 9.9 5.5 3.8 2.9 2.4
35 200 12.0 7.2 5.1 4.0 3.314.1 8.5 6.1 4.7 3.916.1 9.7 6.9 5.4 4.417.810.7 7.6 5.9 4.919.411.6 8.3 6.5 5.3
35 250 16.710.7 7.8 6.2 5.119.812.6 9.2 7.3 6.022.514.310.5 8.3 6.925.015.911.6 9.2 7.627.117.312.710.0 8.3
40  50 20.713.810.3 8.3 6.924.416.312.2 9.8 8.127.818.513.911.1 9.330.820.515.412.310.333.522.316.713.411.2
40 100 23.916.612.710.3 8.628.319.615.012.110.232.222.317.013.811.635.624.718.915.312.838.726.820.516.613.9
40 150 26.719.114.812.110.331.522.517.514.312.135.925.619.916.313.839.828.422.118.115.343.230.924.019.616.6
40 200 4.4 2.4 1.7 1.3 1.0 5.2 2.9 2.0 1.5 1.2 6.0 3.3 2.3 1.8 1.4 6.7 3.7 2.6 2.0 1.6 7.4 4.1 2.8 2.2 1.8
40 250 8.6 5.2 3.7 2.9 2.310.3 6.2 4.4 3.4 2.811.8 7.1 5.1 3.9 3.213.2 7.9 5.6 4.4 3.614.4 8.7 6.2 4.8 3.9
45  50 12.0 7.6 5.6 4.4 3.714.4 9.1 6.7 5.3 4.416.510.5 7.7 6.1 5.018.411.7 8.6 6.8 5.620.212.8 9.4 7.4 6.1
45 100 14.8 9.9 7.4 5.9 4.917.711.8 8.9 7.1 5.920.313.610.2 8.1 6.822.715.211.4 9.1 7.624.916.612.510.0 8.3
45 150 17.211.9 9.1 7.4 6.220.514.210.9 8.8 7.423.616.312.510.1 8.526.318.213.911.3 9.528.820.015.312.410.4
45 200 19.113.710.6 8.7 7.422.916.312.710.4 8.826.318.814.611.910.129.421.016.313.411.332.223.017.914.612.4
45 250 3.2 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.8 3.9 2.2 1.5 1.2 0.9 4.5 2.5 1.7 1.3 1.1 5.1 2.8 2.0 1.5 1.2 5.6 3.1 2.2 1.7 1.3                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 20
Appendix F − Most common values on parameters
Parameters
Market size          α 434.3 Depreciation     δ     0.1
Price elasticity     β  -1.5 Part of adv.    µ     0.6
Cost of production   χ  10.0 Effect of sales η     1.0
Cost of machine unit σ  30.0 Number of firms N     5
Price: Maximum     
MAX p 300.0 Minimum       
MIN p    10.01
Adv.:  Maximum     
MAX a 425.0 Minimum       
MIN a     0
Check. Acc.: Start    1 C 200.0 Minimum       
MIN C -1000.0
Appendix G − Summary of the model
Variables Test period
Period 1  Period 2
Capacity         (1) K       0    10.8
Stocks           (2) S       0     0
Check. acc.      (3) C     200   -92.20
Cumalative adv.  (4) A       0    72.00
Equity           (5) C S K E + + = χ σ     200   231.80
Investment       (6) i      12  1.2
Production       (7) o      12    12
Advertising      (8) a     100   100
Price            (9) p      30    30
Capacity        (10) i K K + = &      12    12
Supply          (11) o S S + = &      12    12
Payments        (12) a o i P + + = χ σ     580   256
Check account   (13) P C C − = &    -380   348.2
Cumulative adv. (14) a A A + = &     100   172
Interest rate   (15) r       0.19   0.18
Demand          (25) ) , , , ( n n A p A p d & &      12.6 14.2
Sales           (26) ] , min[ S d q & =      12.0 12.0
Capacity        (28) K K & & & ) 1 ( δ − =      10.8    10.8
Stocks          (29) q S S − = & & &       0     0
Check. acc.     (30) C r pq C C & & & & + + =     -92.20 -50.88
Cumulative adv. (31) q A A η µ + = & & &      72.00 115.20
Equity          (32) S K C E & & & & & & & & χ σ + + =     231.80 273.12
Profit          (34) E E − = Π & &      31.80  41.32
The two columns to the right contain examples of decisions and results in the first two periods
that are typical, but not optimal.                                                                                          The anatomy of a business game 21
References
Edman, J., (2000), Information use and decision making in groups  - A study
of Experimental Oligopoly Market with the Use of a Business Game,
Stockholm, Sweden: EFI, Stockholm School of Economics. Doctoral thesis.
Faria, A., (2001), “The changing nature of business simulation/gaming
research: a brief history”, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 32, No X, pp 97-110.
Gold S., (2001), “Historical review of algorithm development for
computerized business simulations”, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 32, No X,
pp 66-84.
Holt, C., (1995), “Industrial organization: A survey of laboratory research”, in
J, Kagel & A. Roth (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, pp.
349−443. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Nash, J., (1951), The Annals of Mathematics, 2nd Ser., Vol. 54, No. 2. (Sep.,
1951), pp. 286-295.
Neal, D., (1999), ”How consistent are winning strategies? The role of
competitor analysis and budgets on performance in a simulation”,  Simulation
and Gaming, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp 118-131.
Shubik, M., (1975), “Oligopoly theory, communication, and information”,
American Economic Review, Vol. 65, No X, pp. 280−283.
Shubik, M. & Levitan, R., (1980), Market structure and behavior, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Stigler, G., (1968), “Price and non-price competition”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 76, pp. 149−154.
Ståhl, I. (1986), “The development of a small business game”, Simulation &
Games, Vol. 17, pp. 104−107.
Vives. X., (1999), Oligopoly pricing, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Wolfe, J. & Crookall, D. (1998), “Developing a scientific knowledge of
gaming/simulation”, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 29, pp 7-19.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press.